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Synopsis 
The complexity of Basel II and III has reached China as well. In a revolutionary turn 
within seven years, the Chinese bank regulator has introduced capital adequacy as the 
tool of choice for supervision and ensured that banks in the process remain focused on 
implementing all the bits of the internationally developed Basel Accords. Will it make 
Chinese banks really more resilient? 
 
Basel I, II, III – we want it all at once 
 
In the past Chinese banks were famously undercapitalised and their loan portfolio were 
of rather dubious quality. For example in 2003, on average the banking system showed 
an overall equity to asset ratio of just 3.25%. Rural credit cooperatives had produced 
even a negative ratio with -0.52%. Since then, the banks have had a lot of homework to 
do: from recapitalisation exercises to further improvements in internal controls and loan 
cleaning. So far as to result in capital adequacy ratios (CAR) for commercial banks of 
10.2% by end-2011 (and even 12.7% for the total capital adequacy). Now all or almost 
all commercial banks are compliant with the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 
required 8%.  
 
To reach such levels, the regulators went out of their way to revolutionise the way 
banking and banking supervision in done in China.  
 
Graph 1 Timeline of Basel Accords implementation internationally and in China 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own research 
 
In the past, the central goal in the banking sector was the gathering of deposits. 
Therefore the loan-to-deposit ratio was the single most important performance indicator: 
it was the fundament for paying bonuses, for developing business targets and for judging 
branch business effectiveness. All relied heavily on this single figure because, in the 
absence of an efficient money market, asset growth could only be achieved through 
deposit growth. Furthermore, each branch had to be self-sufficient in terms of funding 
because deposit transfers between branches, across provinces were forbidden. 
Regulation and compliance were all based on the loan-to-deposit ratio (set at 75%). 
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As a consequence, capital and capital adequacy were not on the mind of neither bank 
managers nor bank regulators and capital constraints were unheard of. Such strong 
deposit growth disregarding asset quality and capital adequacy also favoured the building 
up of non-performing loans (NPLs).  
 
Thus when the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) issued in February 2004 a 
regulation on capital adequacy for commercial banks (Regulation governing capital 
adequacy of commercial banks), it was seen as revolutionary by many observers. The 
central bank, People’s Bank of China (PBOC), had previously published a minimum CAR 
of 8% (prescribed in the earlier Commercial Banking Law) but did not give any detailed 
calculation methods or definitions of its components, and adherence was not enforced. 
Furthermore, the new regulations took into account Basel I and Basel II rules as well as 
the prospects of Chinese banks soon facing foreign competition (through the entry to the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2007).  
 
The transition from a quantitative growth (based on attracting deposits or on a funds 
constraint system) to a qualitative growth path (reflecting the quality of the assets held 
or a capital constraint system) formally took place until the end of 2006. At the same 
time the banks were required to increase levels of provisioning.  
 
Even though the rules issued in 2004 took into account only some of the new 
developments in Basel II, the CBRC continued straight on its trajectory of yet stricter 
requirements. Over time it has in fact managed to become even more stringent than 
Basel III (Graph 1). These efforts have pushed Chinese banks in a fully new direction and 
lead their risk management to much higher quality – albeit starting from a really low 
base.  
 
With its pillars 2 and 3 in addition to highly complex risk calculations, the capital accord 
dubbed Basel II was always going to have a strong impact on Chinese banks and their 
environment. This is mainly due to the fact that Basel II and the whole risk management 
framework are at a stark contrast to the Chinese banking reality. The challenges for 
China with Basel II range from capital and risk management to data and disclosure, as 
well as organisational structures, incentive compatibility (between banks and regulators), 
market-oriented supervision and the fostering of financial innovation.  
 
Before the financial crisis erupted in 2008, the CBRC had clearly stated that it would first 
concentrate on implementing Basel I requirements and just use risk governance aspects 
of Basel II rules. With the crisis unfolding and the NPL build up following the stimulus 
package, CBRC took a very different stance. In fact, that “external pressure” was used as 
an excuse to write ever more strict rules. Regulators did not want to lose control of the 
country’s banks as was happening in other G20 countries. Furthermore it was a good 
opportunity to show the world what China is capable of – an important asset when 
Chinese banks need to convince foreign regulators that they are fit enough to open 
branches outside their turfs. For regulators, the implementation of Basel II can 
potentially increase information and bank-level data availability for a better and more 
accurate view and understanding of banks’ risks and potential losses. This in turn will 
enable them to react in a timelier manner. 
 
Anyway, the banks had already started to prepare in 2006. For banks, implementation 
will certainly bring at first higher costs, but pressure to comply comes from the 
regulators, the competitors and the investors. A risk-sensitive approach to business can 
help draw a competitive advantage, and smooth entry in other foreign markets. A better 
risk management can also help increase investors’ confidence.  
 
Table 2 Current situation in China in terms of Basel II implementation  
Area: macro level  Current situation in China  
Baseline supervisory system  Broadly in line with the requirements of Basel II, but lack 
  
of regulators independence.  
Legal-regulatory 
infrastructure  
Issues include: embryonic development of the external 
rating industry, lack of recognition of creditors’ rights and 
absence of bankruptcy proceedings.  
Human resources  Modelling experience is building up from scratch.  
Disclosure regime  Broadly in line with the standards of Basel II.  
Corporate governance  In place, but not sufficiently used.  
Accounting/provisioning 
practices  
Most obstacles have been removed.  
Availability of loss data  Banks are still collecting the data and will need at least up 
until 2013 – or experience a full economic cycle. 
Source: own research.  
 
Although Basel II is complex, costly, requires a high amount of historical data, gives 
much autonomy to banks and is calibrated to G-10 countries, implementing only the 
standardised approach (SA) across the Chinese banking industry means little difference 
to the (relatively) risk-insensitive Basel I. Most conditions required for the full 
implementation of the SA in China are not yet fully realised: credit rating agencies are 
woefully under-developed, externally rated borrowers are few and unlikely to turn to 
banks for financing, corporate bonds data is poor, and finally financial disclosure remains 
scant if not fraudulent.  
 
While the SA does not seem feasible, challenges with IRB approaches definitely exist. 
Apart from the availability of data which is a challenge to all banks, the fact that banks 
have yet to experience a full economic cycle adds a layer of difficulty. In turn this makes 
stress testing and calibration difficult – just to name the most obvious challenges.  
 
In October 2008, the CBRC issued the first notice concerning Basel II implementation in 
China (Notice on supervisory directive concerning the first batch of new capital accord 
implementation). The notice considers five parts regarding the measurement of 
regulatory capital and the regulatory and technical requirements for classification of risk 
exposures, internal ratings systems, specialised lending ratings, credit risk mitigation and 
operational risk management. The notice was followed, two months later, by a further 
pack of eight notices (came into law in 2011) concerning market risk measurement with 
the advanced approach, interest rate risk management on the banking book, liquidity risk 
management, information disclosure on the CAR, validation of the approach for 
operational risk, calculation of the CAR, securitisation exposures, and supervisory review 
of the CAR.  
 
The notices in effect introduced the Basel II framework in full. Risk exposures in the 
banking book shall be divided into sovereign, financial institutions, corporates, retail, 
equity and other on- and off-balance exposures. Internal rating systems should cover the 
first three classes as well as retail but in the form of pools. The constituents of internal 
rating systems are their governance structure to ensure objectivity and reliability, 
technical standards to ensure the same treatment to similar exposures, work flows which 
ensure independence and fairness, risk parameters measurement reflecting 
characteristics into PD and LGD factors, and finally MIS and IT systems. Banks are 
required to conduct at least yearly reviews of their internal rating systems which are the 
responsibility of the BoD. Ratings shall cover both the borrower and the facility, should 
have at least seven non-default and one default grades, and can be through-the-cycle or 
point-in-time. Where information is scarce, ratings should be lower. Internal ratings are 
the judgment of the bank solely and external ratings shall be considered for information 
only. Models underlying the rating systems should also be reviewed and re-assessed 
regularly so as to reduce model risk. Such systems must have been in use for at least 
three years before being approved by the regulators. The ratings produced should 
constitute the basis for setting risk management policies, loan approval, capital allocation 
and governance.  
 
  
Capital disclosure should reflect the bank’s disclosure policies. The content should entail 
the components of the capital base, disclosure on the banks’ individual asset portfolios 
(divided in the above risk classes at least), comments on the policies and objectives of 
risk management in each risk type (interest rate, market, liquidity, and so on.), credit 
risk measurement and provisioning as well as concentration in industries, areas, products, 
borrowers and so on, risk mitigating factors such as securitisation, collateral, and their 
respective calculations. For disclosure about capital, instruments and adequacy, the 
information should be disclosed every quarter, for exposures by risk types and various 
other relevant details half-yearly disclosure is sufficient.  
 
Capital adequacy ratio calculations should cover all subsidiaries owned to more than 50%. 
The rules also detail how to treat other subsidiaries. The capital adequacy calculations 
will reflect internal ratings which cover at least 50% of all assets (80% after three years 
– but 90% within one single entity in the bank). A capital definition is provided again and 
some deductions to it are required for CAR calculations. The capital adequacy calculations 
are the same as put forward in the Basel II document.  
 
As can be seen from the above, most of the requirements and content from the original 
Basel II Accord are found in Chinese regulations. In some aspects the regulators have 
adapted the regulations to fit more closely the Chinese situation and environment (for 
example reducing the number of risk exposures classes in the banking book). Its 
regulations are more detailed in so far as they require more build up of structures and 
processes to achieve Basel II standards (which should come as no surprise since Chinese 
banks have more to catch up and CBRC has a more hands-on approach).  
 
With the financial crisis and after lengthy discussions, the BIS proposed additional 
indicators and measures for regulators to manage other risks which featured prominently 
during the crisis (that is apart from credit risk especially liquidity risks and capital 
quality). The BIS has proposed a new liquidity coverage ratio as well as a stable funding 
ratio. A further document highlights the quality of capital, calls for strengthened capital 
requirements, adds leverage ratios to the supervisory tools and advocates a counter-
cyclical approach. 
 
CBRC at first acknowledged the BIS publications and published a Chinese version, but did 
not publicly comment in detail on the proposals. Then in the second half of 2011, the 
banks were flooded with large proposals for new regulations (among which are the Trial 
Management Rule regarding Liquidity Risk at Commercial Banks and the Management 
Rule regarding the Capital of Commercial Banks which is for now in the form of an 
exposure draft). In effect, the requirements set forth are more stringent and 
implementation should be swifter than that proposed under the international Basel III 
document (Table 3). 
 
  
Table 3 Comparison of Basel regulations 
 Regulation governing 
capital adequacy of 
commercial banks 
By CBRC, Feb. 2004 
Management Rule governing the capital of 
commercial banks 
By CBRC, Aug. 2011 
Basel III Framework as 
proposed by the BIS in 
2010 and 2011 
Scope of 
applicability 
All commercial banks All commercial banks (others should take reference), 
including cooperative banks and village and township 
banks 
On consolidated and single entity basis  
All banks 
On consolidated and single 
entity basis 
Capital 
definition 
Capital is defined in two tiers 
and long-term subordinated 
debt shall not exceed 50% of 
core capital and tier 2 shall 
not exceed the amount of tier 
1 capital. 
Two tiers of capital with tier 1 making at least 75% of the 
total 
capital instruments with loss absorbability features not yet 
available in China 
Core tier 1= paid-in capital, capital surplus, earnings 
retained and standard loss provisions. Deductions include 
the (un)realised gains on valuation changes, on foreign 
exchange, minority interests, allowances for restructurings, 
the equity portion of convertible bonds. 
Tier 1 includes in addition minority interests. Tier 2 
includes moreover a limited portion of the surplus of loan 
loss provisions (above the required minimum), parts of the 
(un)realised gains on valuation changes and allowances 
Deductions to the calculation of the CAR must include all 
intangibles, deferred net tax assets, gaps in loan loss 
provisions, treasury stocks and profits on asset 
securitisations 
Decreased the number of 
capital tiers from 3 to 2 
Focuses more on core 
elements of capital and capital 
quality, capital instruments 
must show loss absorbability 
features 
Minimum 
capital 
requirement
s 
8% (core 4%) which was 
later progressively increased 
to 10.5% and 11.5% for 
small and large banks 
respectively 
Minimum tier 1 core capital of 5%, tier 1 capital +1%, 
conservation buffer +2.5%, tier 2 +2%, counter-cyclical 
buffer +0-2.5%, surcharge for systematically important 
banks +1% 
Calculation of buffers and surcharge based on tier 1 core 
capital 
Minimum tier 1 core capital of 
4.5%, tier 1 capital +1%, 
conservation buffer +2.5%, 
tier 2 +2%, counter-cyclical 
buffer +0-2.5%, surcharge for 
systematically important banks 
+1-5% 
Risk weights 
(RW)  
(includes 
only 
Claims on the Chinese 
government are treated as if 
China was rated better than 
AA- (China as a sovereign is 
Foreign debts take the external rating of the issuer as a 
basis 
Removed preferential treatment of central level SOEs (thus 
all enterprises at 100%) 
- 
  
differences 
and 
departures 
from Basel I 
and II) 
currently rated by Standard & 
Poor’s with A+/A-1+). Risk 
mitigants are recognised in 
the sense of Basel II. A 
further important step taken 
by the regulators is the 
removal of the preferential 
treatment of SOEs (but 
central level SOE kept a RW 
of 50%) 
Domestic banks’ RW changed from 20% to 25% 
RW for SMEs (max. exposure CNY5m) and retail lending 
lowered from 100% to 75% 
RW for mortgages on first homes at 45% and for second 
homes at 60% 
RW for asset management companies (AMC) 100% unless 
that AMC took over the bank’s NPLs 
RW of 250% for equity exposure to FIs, RW of 1,250% for 
equity holdings in commercial enterprises (unless ordered 
by the state or passively held, then 400%) 
RW of 1,250% for immovable assets not held for own use 
Credit conversion factors for off-balance exposures: loan 
commitments 20% (50% over a year), credit cards 50%, 
notes issuance and revolving facilities linked to trade 20% 
(50% otherwise) 
Market risk This applies only to banks 
with trading positions 
exceeding the lesser of 10% 
of the bank’s on- and off-
balance sheet assets or 
CNY8.5bln. 
More stringent VaR calculations, applicable to all banks, 
must take into account central counterparties and credit 
valuation adjustment 
VaR calculation for a 10-day horizon with a confidence 
level of 99% 
must take into account central 
counterparties and credit 
valuation adjustment 
Operational 
risk 
not taken into account in the 
new capital calculations, but 
is addressed in another 
document (more at an 
internal control level) 
Can be taken into account following three approaches (indicator, standard or advanced) 
Categorisati
on of banks 
for 
supervisory 
purposes 
categorised into three groups 
depending on the adequacy 
of their capital (CAR>=8%, 
CAR<8% and CAR<4%). For 
each group CBRC has a range 
of measures at its disposal 
ranging from requiring 
management improvements 
to complete suspension of 
activities. 
Categorised into four groups depending on what level of 
compliance they show (group 1: compliant with all 
minimum capital requirements and pillar II; group 2: 
compliant with all minimum capital requirements; group 3: 
compliant with tier 1 and 2 capital requirements only; 
group 4: not compliant) 
Left to the discretion of 
national regulators 
Information based on Basel II Ad-hoc: when changes occur in capital (instruments)  
  
disclosure 
and 
supervisory 
review 
requirements, the BoD or 
president of the bank is 
responsible for capital 
adequacy and senior 
management is responsible 
for its implementation. 
Supervisory review is 
undertaken through on-site 
review and off-site 
surveillance. 
Quarterly: core tier1, tier 1 and tier 2 as well as related 
CAR 
Semi-annually: consolidation scope of CAR, credit risk 
exposure, NPLs, LLP, asset securitisations, credit risk 
portfolios, market risk, operational risk, equity 
investments, and interest rate risk 
Annually: any other information required in rules 
Provisioning 
requirement
s 
Not explicitly mentioned, but 
China moved to the 
internationally used loan five 
categories in 2004 
general provisions shall be 
raised for 1%, 2%, 25%, 
50% and 100% for each of 
the five loan categories 
Forward looking provisioning covering at least 150% of 
NPLs and 2.5% of all loans 
More dynamic approach depending on economic 
environment 
Bank-specific requirements can be added 
 
Liquidity risk - Net stable funding ratio  
Until end-2012 (small commercial banks end-2016) 
Current ratio min. 25% 
Liquidity coverage ratio min. 100% 
In addition requires proper governance structures, risk 
management policies and processes, regulation and 
information 
Net stable funding ratio min. 
100% 
Until end-2018  
Liquidity coverage ratio min. 
100% 
Leverage 
ratio 
- 4% 
Until end-2012 (small commercial banks end-2013) 
3% 
Until 2016 
Treatment of 
subordinate
d debts 
Can be included in capital tier 
2 
starting from 1 July 2009 not to recognize cross-holdings 
of subordinated debts as capital for CAR calculations. 
Furthermore the notice requires the bank to cap long-term 
subordinated bonds issuance to 25% of the lender’s core 
capital and that those lenders with a CAR below a 7% 
threshold (5% for those non-nationwide banks) should not 
be allowed to make use of subordinated debt to replenish 
capital. 
 
Implementat
ion time line 
2005 onwards Until end-2013 (end-2016 for small commercial banks) 
Banks can submit a deferred implementation plan – 
Phased approach until end-
2018 
  
implementation can be delayed until end-2015 (end-2018 
for small banks) at most 
Although this is an exposure draft, with final 
implementation being recently delayed for “practical 
reasons” by the new and more prudent head regulator, 
Shang Fulin 
Treatment of 
systematicall
y important 
financial 
institutions 
(SIFIs) 
- Special supervision framework considering the levels of major risks, risk absorbance 
capacity, the management of subsidiaries as well as a further 13 indicators 
Firewalls between banks and capital markets to be kept, 
limitations on highly leveraged transactions, issue bail-in 
bonds to absorb losses, stricter rules on commercial 
banking, wide ranging powers of inspectors, extended off-
site supervision, more influence of corporate governance, 
contingency/recovery/resolution plans 
 
  
Within four years, CBRC has completely changed its approach (table 4) from a cherry 
picking model to a full and stricter implementation of Basel III extended to all 
commercial banks. Will that push the banks to the hedge of their capabilities? 
 
Table 4 A changing phased approach 
 Phased approach as of 2008 Phased approach as of 2011 
“New Accord Banks” ICBC, BOC, CCB, ABC, BoComm, 
China Development Bank (CDB), 
Merchants and SPDB 
ICBC, BOC, CCB, ABC, 
BoComm, Merchants (SIFI 
banks) 
Implementation 
schedule 
starting in 2010, the other 
commercial banks from 2011 
onwards 
Starting 2012, even after 
accounting for approved 
delays, until at the latest 
2018 
Preferred approach IRB  IRB 
Application  Those applying for IRB status 
need to be approved by CBRC and 
comply with minimum 
requirements. 
Applicants had until end-
2011 to submit their 
implementation plan to 
CBRC 
Asset coverage from a starting point of 50% to 80% and higher. 
Further requirements The banks need to collect the data, establish rating systems and 
risk measurement models with the appropriate processes and 
procedures 
Chosen path established obligor rating systems 
and four were developing 
transaction ratings, and three 
were working on ratings for retail 
business 
 
 
At the end of 2011, the CBRC statistics for commercial banks, including the larger and 
smaller ones as well as city level and rural entities, and foreign banks, show that the 
banks in all produced a healthy capital adequacy ratio of 12.7% (and 10.2% for tier 1 
capital). Furthermore their current ratio reached 43% well above the required 25%. 
Finally their loan loss provisions covered over 278% of all non-performing loans.  
 
As it appears, the impact of more strict requirements will be more on the governance 
side, as far as the above ratios suggest. In fact much of the discussed asset 
securitisations and complex capital instruments never found their way in China, or at 
least only in very limited volumes. 
 
Chinese banks started to establish risk management structures and rating systems only 
with the beginning of the new century. This late start was the consequence of years of 
policy lending, of capped interest rates, of historical burdens and of poor incentives to 
create sound banks. The newly established risk management units are now separated 
from sales departments and banks have centralised risk management and lending 
decisions against the resistance of previously fiercely independent bank managers. Banks 
have changed the incentive structures of relationship managers, started off-loading NPLs 
and finally have been able to share data through the PBOC credit registry. Despite the 
high hurdles that Chinese banks face, more and more are moving into risk management 
especially that of credit risk.  
 
But all is not well, as the structures are not fully centralised: while the systems are 
common to all entities and levels of decisions within one group, the branches still retain a 
say in decisions through their local risk management units. These units sit awkwardly 
between two lines of responsibility, the first to their risk management counterparts in 
head quarters and the other to their local branch manager – as described in some of the 
largest banks’ annual reports for 2009. Influence by local managers is thus still a reality 
  
and there is still no reporting lines separation between those managing risks and those 
doing business – thus the incentivisation of credit officers is challenged. 
 
Other banks have chosen to centralise credit decisions in a few separate centres: for 
example Industrial Bank has centres in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Fujian. In 
those cases, the branches have to submit credit applications to these centres. To ensure 
that its officers are made responsible for their decisions (often as or within a committee), 
Industrial Bank has also established a special committee investigating responsibilities. Its 
credit policies describe among others which industries should be focused on (along the 
lines of government policies). Other large banks such as China Minsheng Banking Corp 
still have to implement risk management systems to cover all of their activities, products, 
borrowers and risk types. China Minsheng Banking Corp has also drawn three lines of 
defence: business department, risk management and audit department. 
 
Moreover the bank’s boards of directors (BoD) are now to be responsible for designing a 
risk management strategy and implementing it. To this end they can use a number of 
committees, among which is a risk management committee. It is interesting to note 
however that in a number of banks, there is not only one risk management committee, 
but one for BoD and chairman, another one under the president, and possibly another 
one at the head quarters. Observers might rightly question if such arrangements are 
efficient and can really increase the level of barriers to ensure good and independent risk 
management. Additionally, no bank has until now implemented a separation between 
business and credit reporting lines (all report finally to the president of the bank).  
 
As outside observer it is difficult to assess to what extent these credit rating systems are 
being used, how adequate they are and if they are being circumvented more than 
integrated into daily decisions. Furthermore while the professionalism of risk 
management departments will increase over time, it remains to be seen if the same 
happens with their independence and their responsibilities. Further to these, they also 
see more challenges. Credit and loss data are insufficient because a full economic cycle 
has yet to be experienced. A methodology measuring credit risk to support decision-
making is lacking (still often based on collateral availability, and so on) and needs to be 
fully validated.  
 
In line with the regulatory requirements, the banks are – while perfecting and 
strengthening their internal controls, credit monitoring and credit assessment systems – 
now establishing stress testing capabilities and taking steps to actively manage their 
capital (using economic capital, RORAC and EVA for example to allocate capital to 
different industries, borrowers, sub-portfolios, geographic areas and so on).  
 
On the quantitative front, CBRC has conducted preliminary assessments similar to 
quantitative impact assessments of the BIS exercises abroad to gauge the potential 
impact of Basel II implementation on capital adequacy levels. Prior to the assessments, 
CBRC thought that capital adequacy levels would rise, but it appeared to be the contrary. 
Results for ICBC for example showed that the bank could actually lend more than under 
Basel I because it was more than adequately capitalized and its risk weights were better 
differentiated across exposures.  
 
Because most banks show CAR which are already above the required 10.5% or 11.5% 
for smaller and larger banks respectively, the need for capital replenishment in the short 
term is rather limited. However the new capital requirements are not the only ones that 
will slow down growth at Chinese banks (table 5). With mounting fears over local 
government debts, real estate bubbles, trust lending and economic slowdown, the 
regulators have implemented further restrictions. Local government platforms will need 
to be adequately accounted for with appropriate risk weights and management controls, 
real estate exposures are welcome only for first homes and trust products need to be 
moved on balance sheet. Facing a harsher environment, both liquidity and growth will be 
  
dampened. Moreover the banks could face a wave of fresh NPLs related in one way or 
another to the stimulus of 2008.  
 
Table 5 Recapitalisation costs (in CNY bn, based on banks’ financials for 2010) 
 
Four largest 
commercial banks 
Further 13 large 
commercial banks Sum 
Equity, actual 2,741 1,039 3,780 
Loan loss reserves, actual 602 206 807 
Sum of NPL, Special mention 
loans, those overdue for under 90 
days and those restructured 
(actual) 1,333 275 1,608 
Recovery rate of NPLs Assumed at 20% 
Would result in loan losses of 1,066 220 1,286 
Capital surplus (deficit) 2,277 1,024 3,301 
Total loans (gross), actual 23,077 10,498 33,575 
To reach a CAR of 12% would 
require in capital 2,769 1,260 4,029 
less: existing surplus capital 2,277 1,024 3,301 
Recapitalisation cost (surplus 
for growth) 493 240 733 
 
In addition to recapitalisation costs to defray the costs of higher NPLs, the banks will also 
have larger risk weighted assets to take into account (trust loans are required to be 
taken on-balance), which would probably mean a further capital hole of CNY1.2trn to 
cover these trust loans with sufficient capital. Together for the largest 17 banks (together 
covering 63% of the banking assets in China), rough calculations would imply an overall 
capital need of almost CNY2trn. But these back-of-the-envelope calculations fail to 
include liquidity, market and operational risks as well as take into account the 
profitability of banks (their profits are largely protected by the central bank’s base rates 
differentials). 
 
Not only is the capital available going to increase, but costs are also on the increase: the 
costs of implementation are certainly high (at least CNY50m per small bank), but the 
costs of refinancing for banks will also increase, especially for those with poor standing 
and ratings. But more importantly the question is less quantitative and should be more 
qualitative: banks should refrain from exchanging credit risk against model risk. 
 
Apart from the quantitative impact as analysed above, the implementation of the Basel II 
accord will also have a qualitative impact on Chinese banks. Implementation will certainly 
refocus the rewards and incentives of officers and managers and delimit more clearly 
their responsibilities. Internal organisational structures are likely to be remodelled to 
comply towards a separation of reporting lines between risk management and 
operational departments. Information disclosure and transparency will encourage more 
stakeholders to review the banks’ activities and publications. The banks and the 
regulators will hold a wealth of data from which they can not only gauge risks but 
increase the level of financial intermediation. All these are likely to lead to a stronger 
credit culture and more proactive and dynamic risk management.  
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